Classical axiomatizations of belief revision include a postulate stating that if new information is consistent with initial beliefs, then revision amounts to simply adding the new information to the original knowledge base. This postulate assumes a conservative attitude towards initial beliefs, in the sense that an agent faced with the need to revise them will seek to preserve initial beliefs as much as possible. In this work we look at operators that can assume different attitudes towards original beliefs. We provide axiomatizations of these operators by varying the aforementioned postulate and obtain representation results that characterize the new types of operators using preorders on possible worlds. We also present concrete examples for each new type of operator, adapting notions from decision theory.
Introduction
Belief revision models rational changes of an agent's epistemic state triggered by the availability of new, trusted information. In the standard logical approach, an agent's epistemic state is represented by propositional formulas, while the standards of rationality a revision operator is expected to abide by are encoded as logical axioms [Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992; Fermé and Hansson, 2018] . Notably, the classical set of revision postulates turn out to define a class of operators that can be looked at in two ways: on the one hand as change, guided by logical postulates, of propositional theories in response to new data; and on the other hand as choice functions over possible worlds exploiting plausibility rankings over such interpretations. This correspondence tells us that an agent faced with revision of its initial beliefs acts as if it chooses from a set of feasible possible worlds the ones it considers most plausible.
A distinguishing feature of revision operators, as typically axiomatized, is that they can be assumed to adopt a particular attitude towards initial beliefs, enforced through what are called the Inclusion and Vacuity postulates in the AGM formulation [Fermé and Hansson, 2018] , or through a single postulate equivalent to their conjunction in the KM ax- * Contact Author iomatization [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] . This attitude articulates the policy by which the agent's prior information behaves with respect to new data: thus, in the KM axiomatization, the postulate in question states that if new information µ is consistent with existing beliefs κ, then the result of revision is simply κ∧µ. In other words, the agent retains its initial beliefs and simply supplements them with the new item of information, if it can do so in a consistent way. This is in line with a view of revision where the information κ with which the agent starts off represents the possible worlds the agent finds most plausible, information not to be given up unless challenged by conflicting new data, and spells out a conservative attitude towards initial beliefs, guided by the desire to preserve them as much as possible.
In the current work we view such a conservative attitude as one among many that an agent can have towards its initial beliefs. By varying the postulate responsible for enforcing this attitude we are able to axiomatize revision operators that embody a wider range of attitudes towards prior information, and characterize these operators in terms of the types of preorders they induce on the set of possible worlds. To illustrate these principles we provide concrete operators, constructed using two ingredients: a notion of distance between possible worlds and an aggregation function that ranks possible worlds depending on the initial beliefs. We also show, in each case, how these operators fit into the landscape of new postulates introduced. Without the theoretical apparatus of the new postulates, the concrete operators put forward would be merely classified as deviant, since they do not satisfy the traditional blend of Inclusion and Vacuity. But through the present analysis they can be viewed as encoding distinct and characterizable stances an agent can take towards its beliefs.
Alternatives to the classical revision postulates have been considered since as far back as the original publications in the field [Gärdenfors, 1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991; Herzig and Rifi, 1999] . However, we believe that a systematic analysis of the intuition underlying the KM postulate corresponding to Inclusion and Vacuity, as we perform here, sheds new light on familiar topics. base κ is a finite set of propositional formulas, which we typically identify with the conjunction of its formulas µ∈κ µ. The set of all propositional knowledge bases is 2
Prop . The universe U is the set of all possible interpretations (also called possible worlds) for formulas in Prop. The models of a propositional formula µ are the interpretations which satisfy it, and we write [µ] (respectively, [κ]) for the set of models of µ (respectively, for µ∈κ [µ] ). If there is no danger of ambiguity, we write models as words where the letters are the atoms assigned to true, e.g., {{a, b}, {b, c}} is written as {ab, bc}. For µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Prop, we say that µ 1 entails µ 2 , written µ 1 |= µ 2 , if
, and that they are equivalent, written
, and complete if it has exactly one model. The set of consistent knowledge bases is 2 Prop cons . If κ is a propositional knowledge base, then the dual κ of κ is obtained by replacing every literal appearing in κ with its negation. If w is an interpretation, the dual interpretation w is P \ w. If W is a set of interpretations, its dual W is defined as {w | w ∈ W }. Example 1. If P = {a, b, c} and κ = {a, a → b}, then κ = {¬a, ¬a → ¬b}. We have that [κ] = {ab, abc}, the dual of the interpretation ab is ab = c and [κ] = {c, ∅}.
In Example 1 we obtain that [κ] = [κ]. Though we do not provide a formal proof, we mention here that this holds more generally, i.e., for any κ ∈ 2
Prop , it holds that
is the set of binary relations on M. We write < for the strict part of ≤, i.e., x < x if x ≤ x and x ≤ x; moreover, x ≈ x if x ≤ x and x ≤ x. The ≤-minimal elements of M with respect to ≤ are defined as min ≤ M = {x ∈ M | x ∈ M such that x < x}. An assignment from M 1 to M 2 is a function α : M 1 → Bin(M 2 ). We write ≤ κ instead of α(κ) if there is no danger of ambiguity. If W is a set of interpretations, we denote by ϕ W a propositional formula such that [ϕ W ] = W .
Revision: Axioms and Characterizations
A propositional revision operator is a function • : 2 Prop cons × Prop → Prop. The intention is that κ • µ encodes changes brought to existing held beliefs κ such that new, trusted information µ is accepted. A sensible revision operator is expected to resolve inconsistencies between κ and µ and to satisfy certain rationality criteria, presented below.
Basic Postulates
If κ, κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ 2 Prop cons and µ, µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Prop, we first single out a core set of axioms. Note that R 2 as we write it does not coincide with the second KM postulate. The second KM postulate shows up in the latter part of this section.
Postulates R 1−5 are part of the standard set of KM postulates [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] , saying that a revision operator incorporates new information µ (R 1 ), returns a consistent output if µ is consistent (R 2 ), performs its task irrespectively of how beliefs are written down (R 3 ) and satisfies some coherence constraints when the revision formula is varied (R 4−5 ). A revision operator is basic if it satisfies R 1−5 . Throughout the paper, we work only with basic operators.
Basic Assignments
Reflection on postulates R 1−5 reveals that an operator • satisfying them chooses among models of µ and, in doing so, behaves as if it has preferences over units of information. Formally, this is cashed out by assigning to each consistent knowledge base κ in 2
Prop cons a binary relation ≤ κ on interpretations in U : to revise κ by µ, then, becomes equivalent to choosing the best models of µ in ≤ κ . And, in the same way that revision operators are expected to satisfy a set of basic properties (postulates R 1−5 ), rankings on U must satisfy a set of properties, to be introduced in the following, that are conducive to rational choice.
For an assignment α : 2
Prop cons → Bin(U ), a revision operator • and κ, κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ 2 Prop cons , w 1 , w 2 ∈ U , we first consider the following properties:
, for any propositional formula µ. An assignment is basic if it satisfies properties o 1−4 . Notice that properties o 1−2 imply that ≤ κ is a preorder on U . Adding property o 4 makes ≤ κ total, and o 3 adds an independence of syntax aspect to the assignment. If, on top of this, ≤ κ satisfies o 5 , we say that the assignment α represents the revision operator • (and that • is represented by α). The overloading of the term 'basic' is intentional: as Theorem 1 shows, properties o 1−5 define a class of rankings on interpretations that fully characterize revision operators satisfying axioms R 1−5 . Theorem 1. A revision operator satisfies postulates R 1−5 iff there exists an assignment α : 2 Prop cons → U representing it such that, for any κ ∈ 2 Prop cons , ≤ κ satisfies properties o 1−5 . Proof. ("⇒") The proof amounts to checking, one by one, that axioms R 1−5 are satisfied by operator •. The argument is not new, and can be extracted from classical works on the subject [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] .
("⇐") If w 1 ,. . . ,w n are interpretations, we write ϕ 1,...,n for a propositional formula such that [ϕ 1,...,n ] = {w 1 , . . . , w n }.
Assume, now, that we are given a revision operator • that satisfies axioms R 1−5 . For any base κ and w 1 , w 2 ∈ U , we define the assignment α : 2 Prop cons → U by saying that
. We now show that ≤ κ , thus defined, satisfies properties o 1−5 .
Property o 1 (reflexivity) follows using axioms R 1 and R 3 . For property o 2 (transitivity), take w 1 , w 2 and w 3 such that w 1 ≤ κ w 2 and w 2 ≤ κ w 3 . First we show that
Notice that, by axioms R 1 and R 2 , we have that
is consistent. Using axioms R 4−5 and R 3 again, we get that w 2 ∈ [κ•ϕ 1,2,3 ]. Reproducing the reasoning from Case 2, we conclude that
Once we have that w 1 ∈ [κ • ϕ 1,2,3 ], it follows that (κ • ϕ 1,2,3 ) ∧ ϕ 1,3 is consistent. So, by axioms R 4−5 and R 3 , we have that:
. This implies that w 1 ≤ κ w 3 . Property o 3 follows from the fact that the definition of ≤ κ does not depend in any way on the syntax of κ. Property o 4 follows by axioms R 1−2 . For property o 5 , we show the double inclusion. ("⊆") Take w 1 ∈ [κ • µ], and w 2 ∈ [µ]. We get that w 1 ∈ [(κ•µ)∧ϕ 1,2 ] and, by axioms R 4 and R 3 , it follows that
Since it follows that µ is consistent, we have, by axioms R 1−2 , that there exists
, and hence w 2 < κ w 1 . But we also have that w 1 ∈ min ≤κ [µ], implying that w 1 ≤ κ w 2 , which is a contradiction.
Theorem 1 tells us that an agent revising beliefs along the lines of postulates R 1−5 behaves as if it ranks interpretations in U in a total preorder ≤ κ that depends on initial beliefs κ, and always picks the minimal models of µ according to ≤ κ . Such an agent, then, behaves like a rational agent, in the sense of rational choice theory [Sen, 1984; French, 1988] , choosing the best elements from a given menu of options: the menu, here, would be the models of µ, i.e., the possible worlds the agent is allowed to believe in light of new information, while the best elements are decided with reference to ≤ κ . Thus, a revision operator can be seen as a choice function over sets of interpretations: accordingly, Theorem 1 aligns with standard choice theoretic results [Arrow, 1959; Sen, 1984; Moulin, 1991] . That a similar mathematical formalism underlies both belief revision and rational choice is, by itself, not a new insight, the topic having been studied under various guises [Rott, 2001; Bonanno, 2009] . The main difference is one of interpretation, with ≤ κ usually thought of in revision as a plausibility ranking, i.e., the agent's assessment as to which possible worlds are more or less plausible.
Example 2. A doctor knows that the patient has been diagnosed with asthma (a), finds out that the patient is suffering from shortness of breath (b) and infers that chest pain (c) is also present: the two often go together in asthma, and such stereotypical examples are more salient in the doctor's mind than less frequent, more exotic examples. In other words, the doctor has initial information κ = a and a plausibility ranking ≤ κ over possible worlds (with respect to the alphabet P = {a, b, c}) depicted in Figure 1 . The doctor then revises by µ = b and settles on a possible state of affairs that One way of thinking of postulates R 1−5 is that they axiomatize total preorders on interpretations. These preorders nominally depend on κ, but nothing in postulates R 1−5 touches on how models of κ should influence these preorders. In other words, there is as yet no information about the attitude of an agent towards its initial epistemic state, and postulates R 1−5 are consistent with arbitrary attitudes towards κ. How should the models of κ stand in relation to all other interpretations? Example 2 offers a glimpse into one possible answer: the agent starts off with some information κ and differentiates among possible worlds consistent with κ: some of these worlds are more plausible than others, perhaps as a result of being more salient, or because of a systematic bias [Kahneman et al., 1982] . Still, as a whole, models of κ are more plausible than any other interpretations consistent with the new information µ. In other words, the agent is biased towards the possible worlds consistent with κ. Are there, now, other ways of arranging the models of κ in ≤ κ , ways that span the space of possible such attitudes? We study this question through the lens of additional axioms.
Attitudes Towards Initial Beliefs
If κ, κ ∈ 2 Prop cons , µ ∈ Prop, consider the following postulates:
Each of these postulates encodes a particular type of attitude towards initial beliefs, and they are intended to be thought of in conjunction with the basic set of postulates R 1−5 . Some clarification is in order. Postulate R 6 models an agent that incorporates all information in κ ∧ µ, and possibly extends this to cover more ground. Postulate R 7 models an agent that reserves the right to drop information from κ if it so sees fit, even if that information is consistent with µ: we may imagine this is done on the basis of certain preferences over the information encoded by κ, i.e., the agent is partial towards certain parts of κ to the detriment of others. Taken together, postulates R 6−7 imply that κ • µ is equivalent to κ ∧ µ, when κ ∧ µ is consistent. This property models an agent who wants to preserve as much of κ as it can, and does not have any bias towards either of the models of κ. Postulate R 6 can be equated with the Inclusion postulate in the AGM formulation and R 7 corresponds to Vacuity [Fermé and Hansson, 2018] , while in the KM axiomatization R 6 and R 7 are packaged together in one postulate (i.e., KM postulate R 2 ) and presented alongside R 1−5 as the default set of rational properties for revision [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] .
Postulates R 8−9 focus on the dual knowledge base κ obtained by replacing every literal in κ with its negated version. If κ is a conjunction of literals, or if it is a complete (i.e., with exactly one model) formula, then κ will be a formula whose models are complements of the models of κ.
Example 3. If P = {a, b, c} and κ = {a ∧ b} is a knowledge base over the alphabet P, then κ = {¬a ∧ ¬b}, and we have that [κ] = {ab, abc}, while [κ] = {∅, c} Thus, if κ is very specific (e.g., is a conjunction of literals), then κ can be thought of as the point of view opposite to that of κ, and situations can be imagined in which it is desirable to put bounds on the revision function in terms of how it treats information encoded by κ. This is the case if the agent has, or is required to have, a definite opinion on every item from an agenda, as is typically the case in Judgment Aggregation [Endriss, 2016] ; if κ is a 'vivid' knowledge base [Levesque, 1986] ; or, if it encodes something like an agent's preferred bundle from a set of available items. In all these cases κ can be required to be a conjunction of literals or a complete formula.
Postulate R 8 says that if κ undergoes revision by a formula µ embodying such an adverse perspective, then the agent must adopt µ: in other words, the agent has no room for maneuvering towards a more amenable middle ground. Such a revision policy makes more sense when considered alongside postulate R 9 , which specifies that if the agent has the option of believing states of affairs not compatible with κ, it should wholeheartedly adopt those as the most plausible stance. Taken together, postulates R 8−9 inform the agent to believe states of affairs compatible with κ only if it has no other choice in the matter: the models of κ should be part of a viewpoint one is willing to accept only as a last resort. Postulate R 10 is best understood through an example.
Example 4. An agent intends to go to an art museum, the beach and a concert, i.e., κ = {a ∧ b ∧ c}, with P = {a, b, c}. The agent then learns that it only has time for one of these activities and chooses the art museum, i.e., κ•µ ≡ a∧¬b∧¬c. If the agent's initial intentions were less specific, for instance that it would either go to all three places or only to the art museum (i.e., κ = {(a ∧ b ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c)}), then, faced with the same new information µ, a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c should still feature as one of its most preferred options.
A clearer view of postulates R 6−10 emerges when looking at how they situate the models of κ in a total preorder ≤ κ , for κ, κ ∈ 2 Prop cons , w 1 , w 2 , w ∈ U :
(o 10 ) If w ≤ κ w and [κ ] = {w }, then w ≤ κ∨κ w.
Properties o 6−10 turn out to characterize axioms R 6−10 on the semantic level, as per the following representation result. Theorem 2. If • is a basic revision operator and α : 2 Prop cons → U is a basic assignment that represents it, then, for any κ ∈ 2 Prop cons and µ ∈ Prop, the following equivalences hold: (1) • satisfies axiom R 6 iff ≤ κ satisfies property o 6 ; (2) • satisfies axiom R 7 iff ≤ κ satisfies property o 7 ; (3) • satisfies axiom R 8 iff ≤ κ satisfies property o 8 ; (4) • satisfies axiom R 9 iff ≤ κ satisfies property o 9 ; (5) • satisfies axiom R 10 iff ≤ κ satisfies property o 10 .
Proof. Recall that we denote by ϕ 1,2 a propositional formula such that [ϕ 1,2 ] = {w 1 , w 2 }. For equivalence 1, we show each direction in turn. ("⇒") Take an assignment α satisfying property o 6 , and the revision operator • represented by it. We assume that κ ∧ µ is consistent, and show that for any w ∈ [κ ∧ µ], it holds that w ∈ [κ • µ] as well. By property o 5 , this is equivalent to showing that w ∈ min ≤κ [µ] . Take w ∈ [µ]. Since w ∈ [κ], we can apply property o 6 to get that w≤ κ w . Hence w ∈ min ≤κ [µ] . ("⇐") Take a basic revision operator • satisfying R 6 . and the assignment α which represents it. To show that ≤ κ satisfies property o 6 , take two interpretations w 1 and w 2 such that w 1 ∈ [κ]. Then, by axiom R 6 , we have that
Equivalence 2 uses similar reasoning, and equivalences 3 and 4 are analogous to 1 and 2, respectively. For equivalence 5, assume first that axiom R 10 holds, and take interpretations w and w and a knowledge base κ such that w ≤ κ w and [κ ] = {w }. To show that w ≤ κ∨κ w, we must show that w ∈ [(κ ∨ κ ) • ϕ w,w ], where ϕ w,w is a formula such that [ϕ w,w ] = {w, w }. This follows immediately by applying axiom R 10 . Conversely, suppose [κ ] = {w }, and take w ∈ [κ • µ]. Then, we get that w ≤ κ w, and we can apply property o 10 to derive the conclusion.
Theorem 2 is better understood through an illustration of how such preorders treat models of κ. Property o 6 says that models of κ are minimal elements in κ, i.e., the agent considers possible worlds satisfying its beliefs among the most plausible possible worlds, though possibly not uniquely so (Figure 2-(a) ). Property o 7 states that there are no counter-models of κ more plausible than the models of κ, but the models of κ themselves may not be equally plausible (Figure 2-(b) ). Properties o 8−9 say that models of the dual knowledge base κ are the least plausible interpretations in ≤ κ (Figure 2-(c,d) ), while property o 10 says that if w is more plausible than w when the initial beliefs are κ, then w would still be more plausible than w if it were part of the initial beliefs (Figure 2-(e) ).
Together, properties o 1−7 define what is more commonly known as a faithful assignment, placing all and only models of κ on the lowest level of ≤ κ . This corresponds to an agent that holds its initial beliefs to be the most plausible states of affairs [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] . Consequently,
Figure 2: Schematic view of prototypical preorders satisfying each of the properties o6−10; models of κ are in the light gray area, models of κ are in the dark gray area.
Theorem 1 plus equivalences 1-2 from Theorem 2 make up the classical representation result for belief revision operators [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] . Here we have opted for a more fine-grained approach to the placement of models of κ in ≤ κ , which allows a more diverse representation of the different types of attitudes an agent can have towards initial beliefs. Though operators that do not satisfy the classical KM postulate R 2 have been considered before [Ryan, 1996; Benferhat et al., 2005] , the idea that such deviations correspond to possible epistemic attitudes and can be axiomatized is, to the best of our knowledge, new.
Indifference to Already Held Beliefs
One particular consequence of weakening the KM axiom R 2 (axioms R 6−7 in the current context) is that the following property is not guaranteed to hold anymore:
This property, called here R IDF (for indifference to already held beliefs), says that revising with information the agent already believes does not change the agent's epistemic state. More generally, the KM standard set of postulates implies that revising by any formula µ such that κ |= µ results in κ. It quickly becomes apparent that axiom R 6 implies R IDF , 1 but R 7 does not. Thus, if an agent is allowed to rank models of κ unequally, then R IDF is not guaranteed to hold. Example 5. If P = {a, b}, take κ = {a ∨ b} and a revision operator that satisfies axiom R 7 , and which orders interpretations as follows:
This points to a more graded view of what it means to believe κ. Thus, an agent might have a certain threshold of plausibility, along the lines of what is known in epistemology as the Lockean thesis [Foley, 1993] , according to which it calibrates its beliefs: anything above the threshold counts as part of the belief κ and anything below counts as disbelief. This fits with the idea that an agent might assign different degrees of plausibility to states of affairs consistent with its belief κ: indeed, this is the point of view we endorse here, in contrast to more standard approaches, which consider that an agent assigns equal degrees of plausibility to all items of its belief. Thus, incoming information that confirms an agent's belief 1 The converse is not true: R IDF enforces only that models of κ are equally plausible, but not where they are placed in ≤κ.
might have the effect of reinforcing parts that are given more plausibility at the expense of parts that are given less, and this is the kind of situation we take to be modeled by Example 5.
What would be worrying would be a revision policy that makes an agent cycle between different viewpoints when confronted repeatedly with the same type of information: we will see that for revision operators satisfying R 7 this concern is unwarranted, but we must first introduce some new notation. We write κ i for the knowledge base obtained by revising κ by itself an i number of times. Thus, κ 0 = κ and κ i+1 = κ i • κ. Consider now the following property: (R STB ) There is n ≥ 1 such that κ m ≡ κ n , for every m ≥ n.
A revision operator • is stable if it satisfies property R STB . Stability implies that repeated revision by κ ultimately settles (or stabilizes) on a set of models that does not change through subsequent revisions by κ. The following result proves relevant to the issue of stability. Proposition 3. If a revision operator • satisfies axioms R 1 and R 7 , then κ i+1 |= κ i .
Proof. By axiom R 1 , we have that κ • κ |= κ, and thus κ 1 |= κ 0 . Applying axiom R 7 , we have that
2 |= κ 1 , and it is straightforward to see how this argument is iterated to get the conclusion.
If the operator • also satisfies axiom R 2 (which, here, says that if the revision formula is consistent, then the revision result is also consistent), it follows that if κ is consistent, then κ i is consistent, for any i ≥ 0. Thus, combining this fact and Proposition 3, we get that repeated revision by κ leads to a chain of ever more specific knowledge bases, i.e.,
. Since a knowledge base has a finite number of models, it falls out immediately from this that there must be a point at which further revision by κ does not change anything. Corollary 4. A basic revision operator • satisfying axiom R 7 is stable. Unfortunately, axioms R 8−9 do not guarantee stability. Since these axioms require only that the agent places the models of κ as the least plausible interpretations, it becomes possible that an agent's plausibility ranking does not hold on to a core set of interpretations through successive revisions by κ. Example 6. If P = {a, b}, take κ = {¬b} and a revision operator satisfying R 8−9 , which orders interpretations as shown in Figure 3 . We have that The issue of stability suggests another dimension along which revision operators can be analyzed, with Corollary 4 and Example 6 showing that a revision operator does not satisfy it trivially. Example 6, in particular, shows that there is interplay between ≤ κ and ≤ κ , if κ |= κ, which is relevant to the question of whether an operator is stable. This interplay is reminiscent of topics like iterated revision and kinetic consistency [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997; Peppas and Williams, 2016] , but pursuing it further would take us too far afield of the aims of the current work. 
Concrete Operators with Varying Attitudes
We now ask: what is a natural way to construct operators with such varying attitudes towards initial information? Our answer builds on ideas found in belief merging [Konieczny et al., 2004; Konieczny and Pérez, 2011] , i.e., it defines rankings on interpretations by appeal to two main ingredients. The first is a distance d : U × U → R ≥0 between interpretations, defined such that d(w 1 , w 2 ) = 0 iff w 1 = w 2 and d(w 1 , w 2 ) = d(w 2 , w 1 ). Given w ∈ U and κ ∈ 2
